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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Stevenson appeals, asserting that the district court

by denying his

motions for credit for time served and for leniency filed pursuant to I.C.R. 35. In regard
to the motion for credit for time served, he recognizes that the appellate courts have
consistently held that the district courts are not authorized to award credit for time spent
on probation, but contends that those decisions fail to give effect to the language of the
statute, as written, and therefore, should be rejected. 1 Rather, this Court should look at
the plain language of the statute and give it the appropriate effect. Since the statute
says that credit shall not be awarded during the time a defendant is "temporarily
released" and "at large," and release on probation is neither, the district court's order
denying an award of credit for that time is erroneous.

Therefore, Mr. Stevenson

requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying his motion for credit for
time served and remand the case for a calculation of the credit to which he is entitled.
In regard to his motion for leniency, Mr. Stevenson argues that the district court
abused its discretion by not sufficiently considering the mitigating factors in the record in
light of the new and additional information he presented with his motion.

He also

contends that the grounds for appeal on that issue make out a colorable need for the
inclusion of various transcripts.

Therefore, even under the Idaho Supreme Court's

recent opinion in State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724 (2013), reh'g denied, the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision to deny his motion to augment the record with those
transcripts violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a

See, e.g., State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 610 (1992); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122,
126 (Ct. App. 1996); Tay/or v. State, 145 Idaho 866,869-70 (Ct. App. 2008).

1

1

result, this Court should grant Mr. Stevenson access to the requested transcripts and
allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from
review of those transcripts. In the event that request is denied, this Court should still
vacate the district court's order denying his motion for leniency and reduce his sentence
as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand the case so that the district court can
reduce his sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 200B, Mr. Stevenson was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, as
as a sentencing enhancement for use of a deadly weapon.
Mr. Stevenson stated that he had

(R., pp.27-2B.)

a knife in an attempt to defend himself from

people, his ex girlfriend (L.B.), her teenage son (T.B.), and her son's friend (C.M.),
as they approached him in an aggressive manner and took his backpack. (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.68-69.)2 The police report indicates that the
victims' admitted they were trying to take the backpack, but did so in an effort to recover
some property of L.B.'s which they said Mr. Stevenson had taken.

(PSI, p.81.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Stevenson pled guilty to one of the charges of
aggravated assault and the weapon enhancement. (R., pp.56-57.) The State agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a unified sentence of eight years, with
two years fixed, to be suspended for a period of probation, which would include local jail
time as a condition of that release.

(R., pp.56-60.)

The district court followed that

2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"STEVENSON psi." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents
attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.).
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recommendation, suspending the sentence for an eight-year period of probation.
(R, pp.75-76.)
part of that period of probation, the district court imposed some nineteen
special conditions by which Mr. Stevenson would be required to abide. (R, pp.76-78.)
Those conditions included service of 210 days in the local jail, waiver of Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment rights, restrictions on Mr. Stevenson's use of his time and
money, and restrictions on his ability to move about. (R, pp.76-78.) Mr. Stevenson
was also advised that credit would not be awarded for the time spent on probation.
(R, p.78)
Mr.

While his performance during

period of probation was not perfect,

was able to comply with most of the terms of his probation for three
(See generally R)

However, in 2012, the State filed a motion for probation violation, al/eging various
violations occurring between 2010 and 2012. (R, pp.106-08.) Mr. Stevenson ultimately
admitted to being charged with three new misdemeanor offenses and drinking alcohol
on three different occasions. (See R., pp.107-08, 141.) A mental health evaluation was
performed following those admissions and diagnosed Mr. Stevenson as suffering from
major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified). (PSI, p.27.)
Considering this information, both the probation officer and the presentence investigator
recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction. (PSI, p.6; R., p.112.) The district
court followed that recommendation. (R., pp.141-46.)
Unfortunately, Mr. Stevenson did not perform well during that period of retained
jurisdiction, as there were several incidents which the staff indicated could have
constituted formal disciplinary reports.

(PSI, p.31.) However, no formal disciplinary

reports were filed against Mr. Stevenson. (PSI, p.31.) There were also reports that

3

Mr. Stevenson refused to participate in the programs as directed. (PSI, pp.31-32.) As
such, the rider staff recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction.

I,

p.34.) The district court followed that recommendation. (R., pp.150-52.)
Thereafter, Mr. Stevenson filed two pro se motions pursuant to I.C.R. 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35). The first, filed pursuant to Rule 35(b), requested that the district
court reconsider his sentence and grant leniency.

(R., pp.163-66.)

Counsel was

subsequently appointed to represent Mr. Stevenson on that motion, and counsel filed an
addendum to support that motion which contained a report of Mr. Stevenson's
programming efforts while in prison. (R., pp.181-83.)

The district court denied that

motion, pointing to Mr. Stevenson's failures during his periods of probation and retained
jurisdiction, which it decided demonstrated that the sentence imposed was still
appropriate. (R., pp.186-87.)
The second motion was filed pursuant to Rule 35(c) and requested credit for the
time Mr. Stevenson had been on probation and complying with the terms thereof.
(R., pp.177-78.) He contended that credit was appropriate because he was subject to
numerous restrictive conditions, and thus, his probation was more akin to incarceration.
(R., pp.177 -78.) The district court denied that motion based on precedent which held
that probationers are not entitled to credit for the time served on probation. (R., p.190.)
Mr. Stevenson filed separate, timely notices of appeal from each of the district
court's decisions on his Rule 35 motions. (R., pp.195-201.) On appeal, he requested
that transcripts of five hearings be prepared and augmented in to the appellate record. 3

Specifically, he requested the transcripts from the change of plea hearing held on
March 2, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on April 10, 2009, the admit/deny hearing
held on March 30, 2012, the dispositional hearing held on May 18, 2012, and the rider
review hearing held on September 12, 2012. However, on appeal, he is not pursuing
his requests for the transcripts of the change of plea or admit/deny hearings.
3

4

(Motion to Augment
Thereof, filed

Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
2013.)

Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without

explanation. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule,
dated October 16,2013.)

5

ISSUES
'1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Stevenson's motion for credit for
time served while on probation.

2.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court deprived Mr. Stevenson of His constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection by denying his request to augment the
record with transcripts of hearings relevant to the issue of whether the district
court should have reduced his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b).

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Stevenson's
motion for reduction in sentence.

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Stevenson's Motion For Credit For Time Served
While On Probation
A.

Introduction
Mr. Stevenson contends on appeal that Idaho Code §

18~309,

which governs

awards of credit for time served is being misinterpreted, and thus, erroneously applied.
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises
review." State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274 (2004). Specifically, I.C. § 18-309 provides:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, [sic] shall receive credit in the judgment for any
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
I.C. § 18-309. The relevant part of the statute to Mr. Stevenson's claim is the second
sentence. That portion of the statute is written so that service of the sentence begins at
the pronouncement of the sentence and continues to accrue unless a certain set of
circumstances arises - a temporary release from imprisonment. In that case, only the
time at which the defendant was "at large" does not count.
Since release on probation is not "temporary," nor is a probationer who has not
absconded supervision "at large" pursuant to the common definition of that term of art,
release on probation does not stop the service against the sentence. As a result, the
probationer who is adhering to the terms of his probation and not absconding
supervision is entitled to credit under I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, the district court erred
when it declined to award such credit for the time that Mr. Stevenson was on probation

7

adhering to the terms and conditions thereof. At the least, the statute is ambiguous
as to whether credit is properly awarded in that situation, and the rule of lenity provides
that the ambiguity should be resolved in Mr. Stevenson's favor.

8.

As Probation Is Not A "Temporary" Release, It Does Not Meet All The Conditions
So That Credit May 8e Denied For The Time Served Pursuant To That Period Of
Probation
When reviewing the application of a statute, the terms in the statute are given

their ordinary definitions.

Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151

Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011).

Mr. Stevenson recognizes that, by ordinary definition,

probation is a release from imprisonment (imposed at the pronouncement of sentence
and subsequently suspended), and that probation is a legal means to secure that
release. See I.C. § 19-2601(2). Such a release is not, however, temporary. The word
"temporary" is ordinarily defined as "lasting for a time only."

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S

DICTIONARY, 821. Therefore, the phrase "by any legal means is temporarily released
from incarceration" is ordinarily understood to mean "by legal means is released for a
time only from such incarceration." See id.
Probation is not designed to release the person from incarceration for a time
only; it is designed to release him from incarceration permanently. See, e.g., I.C. § 192604(1).

If a probationer successfully completes his period of probation, he is not

required to go to prison. See id. Rather, when the sentencing court determines that the
defendant has satisfactorily completed the period of probation, it may: terminate the
sentence; set aside the guilty plea or conviction, dismiss the case, and discharge the
defendant; or, amend the sentence to be equivalent to the period of time the defendant
served in a penal facility prior to the suspension of his sentence, which may then be
treated as a misdemeanor.

I.C. § 19-2604(1).

8

Regardless of which option the

sentencing court opts to
to be

the defendant is free to leave custody and is not required

again before doing so. See id. Therefore, a term of probation

classified as a "temporary" release from incarceration or a release from incarceration
"for a limited time only." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, 821.
This distinction becomes clear when the period of probation is compared to the
grant of a furlough to an inmate.

Furloughs are a legal means which permit an

incarcerated person to be released from that incarceration so they might maintain
regular employment, schooling, and the like.

I.C. § 20-242(1).

However, unlike the

probationer, who is not required to return to the prison, the furloughed inmate must
return to incarceration during the time he is not participating in
his furlough.

§§ 20-242(3);

furloughed inmate return to

14(3).

activity underlying

As a result of the requirement that

place of his incarceration, the release is "for a limited

time only" (i.e., the hours allotted for the employment or schooling), and thus, it is
"temporary." However, as the probationer carries no such similar requirement to retum
to incarceration, and so, the probationer's release is not temporary.
Further exemplifying why probationers are not temporarily released, they have a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in remaining on probation. State v. Rose, 144
Idaho 762, 766 (2007) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). As such, before the State
may terminate that period of probation, it must provide the defendant with certain due
process protections.

Id.

This makes probation distinctly different from temporary

releases, like furloughs, since such privileges may be revoked at any time by the
Department of Correction without providing due process protections, specifically notice
and a hearing. See I.C. § 20-242(7). Therefore, because release on probation embues

9

a probationer with liberty interests and due process rights, such a release is designed to
permanent, not temporary.
As probationary release is not temporary, the period during which the defendant
is on probation does not satisfy the conditional scenario under which the statute would
exclude credit. See I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, under a proper interpretation, I.C. § 18309 does not allow the denial of credit for the period when Mr. Stevenson was in
custody while on probation. As such, it was improper for the district court to deny his
motion for credit for that time.

C.

The Period During Which The Defendant Is "At Large" Only Applies To Periods
When He Has Escaped Or Absconded, Not The Entire Period Of Probation
Even if this Court determines that probation constitutes a temporary

the

statute still does not permit the denial of credit for the period during which the defendant
was adhering to the terms of his probation because a person who is adhering to the
terms and conditions of his probation and has not absconded supervision is not "at
large." Only "the time during which he was at large must not be computed as part of
such term [of sentence]." I.C. § 18-309. Thus, if the probationer is not "at large," the
statute does not allow the district court to deny credit for that period of time. Reading
the term otherwise ignores the ordinary definition of the term "at large" and makes an
invalid equation of the period of temporary release to the period during which the
defendant was "at large."

Therefore, that alternate interpretation of the statute is

unreasonable and must be rejected. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.
First, this Court must consider the Legislature's choice of terms. See id. "[The
Idaho Supreme Court] assumes that the [L]egislature meant what is clearly stated in the
statute." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). In this case, the Legislature used
10

a unique term of art
not

"at large"

which has a specific definition: "Free; unrestrained;

control <the suspect is still at

pocket ed. 2006).

"

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

52 (3rd

Where terms and phrases, such as "at large," have developed

specific definitions, the Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of that definition.
See Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212 (2003) (discussing a situation

where jurisprudence expanded the definition of the term in question beyond a commonusage definition for purposes of a specific statute). Therefore, by using this particular
term, the Legislature intended that it mean something different than "by any legal means
is temporarily released from such imprisonment." See Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray
Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008) (holding that, when courts engage in statutory

construction, they are to favor interpretations

give meaning to every word, clause,

and sentence the Legislature chose to use).
Reading the terms "by any legal means is temporarily released" and "at large" as
coextensive deprives the term "at large" of meaning, which would improperly make it
surplussage. See id; State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 803 (1995). Had the Legislature
intended to deprive a person of credit for the entire period during which he was
temporarily released from incarceration, it would have used the same term, "temporarily
released," in both parts of the statute. 4 Instead, the Legislature chose to use a different,
narrower, term to describe the period of time for which credit is not to be awarded. See
I.C. § 18-309. Because it chose to use a different term with a different definition, that
term must have a different meaning in the statute. See Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 900;
Martinez, 126 Idaho at 803.

For example, "during such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily
released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during
which he was [temporarily released] must not be computed as part of such term."
4

11

The Legislature's intent behind using this restrictive phrase to limit the time for
which credit may

denied is clarified by referring to the illustrative definition of "at

large," which reads: "<the suspect is still at large>." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 52. This
example refers to a situation where the person is not in custody, but rather, is evading
capture and at a location unknown to authorities. See id. In fact, the Court of Appeals,
specifically in regard to I.C. § 18-309, has indicated that this is the proper use of the
term: "a prisoner who escapes from incarceration should [not] be permitted accrual of
the time toward his sentence while he is at large." Application of Chapa, 115 Idaho 439,
443 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added).

In a similar situation, the Court of Appeals

modified a district court's award of credit to deny the award for three days, "tak[ing] into
account the three days that [the defendant] was at large following his escape."
Fullmerv. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 172 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). As such,
the term "at large" does not broadly apply to all situations where the defendant is not
incarcerated, but rather, only to those situations where he is not in custody and his
whereabouts are unknown.
In the context of probation, those conditions are only met when the probationer
absconds from supervision.

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized

that, "by virtue of their status alone, probationers ' 'do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled,' , , justifying the 'impos[ition] [of] reasonable conditions
that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.' "
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)))). It has also recognized that
probation is like incarceration, in that it is a punishment imposed by the justice system,
12

and like other forms of punishment, restricts the person's freedoms. Knights, 534 U.S.
at 119. As a result, probationers

have not absconded supervision,

definition,

cannot be free, unrestrained, or not under control, and thus, are not "at large."
The rationales supporting the narrow reading of the term "at large" are twofold.
First, to interpret "at large" as equivalent to "temporarily released by legal means," and
so deny credit for all the time served on probation, would place this statute in inherent
conflict with other sections of this statutory scheme. The courts are duty-bound, when
construing statutes, to harmonize and reconcile the statutory scheme whenever
possible.

Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 104 (2004);

State v. Gamino, 1

Idaho 827, 829 (Ct. App. 2010).
an inmate who is

incarceration by legal means. See I

a furlough is temporarily

§

However, if "at large" is to

as

equivalent to the period of that temporary release, the furloughed inmate would not be
entitled to credit during the time he is not incarcerated (i.e., released on furlough). Such
a result is directly contrary to the purpose of the furlough statute, which was enacted to
provide an incarcerated person serving his sentence with the opportunity to maintain his
employment or complete his education without undue interruption from the sentence.
See I.C. § 20-242(1 )-(2). He was meant to be able to serve his sentence (i.e., get credit

against his sentence) while simultaneously being released from incarceration in order to
continue his employment or education.

See id.

However, if "at large" is given its

proper, narrow definition, the two statutes may be harmonized, because if the
furloughed inmate does not return at the end of his furlough, he has absconded
supervision, and is "at large." Thus, he would not be entitled to credit for the time during
which he was "at large." Therefore, since reading "at large" in such a broad manner
13

creates discord between the statutes and a harmonizing interpretation is possible, the
discordant interpretation should be rejected.

Housel, 140 Idaho at 104; Gamino,

148 Idaho at 829.
The second reason why the altemative interpretation is unreasonable is that the
Legislature has already provided that parolees are able to receive credit for the time
during which they are released from incarceration pursuant to the terms of their parole,
with such credit awarded at the discretion of the parole board. I.C. § 20-228; 1998
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 327, § 2, p.1057; compare with I.C. § 18-309. 5 Release on
parole and release on probation are so similar that some aspects of both situations,
such as the supervisory authority of the Department of Correction in both instances, are
addressed in a single statute.

See, e.g., I

§ 20-219(1). However, by reading

large" broadly, so as to prevent probationers from being awarded credit for the time
spent on probation, probationers are prevented from receiving similar treatment to
parolees.
The incongruity of maintaining such a distinction, particularly between two such
similar situations, was criticized by Judge Schwartzman soon after the Legislature made
the change in the parole statute:

"If a parolee may now be able to receive some

discretionary credit for time actually spent on parole in an unincarcerated [sic] status,
how much sense does it make to not give a probationee [sic] credit for time served while

Of particular note in this comparison is the fact that I.C. § 20-228 provides "[f]rom and
after the issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person
and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice." I.C. § 20-228.
This corresponds with I.C. § 18-309's prohibition against the award of credit for time that
the defendant is "at large" (i.e., a fugitive). See I.C. § 18-309; Black's Law Dictionary
52. Despite that assertion, however, I.C. § 20-228 immediately goes on to provide that
the parole commission may grant credit for the time which the parolee served on parole.
I.C. § 20-228. Therefore, a similar interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 is also reasonable.
5
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actually incarcerated as a condition of probation?" State v. Jakoski, 1

Idaho 67, 69

App. 1998) (Schwartzman, Judge, specially concurring) (emphasis in original).
Judge Schwartzman was particularly focused on the denial of credit for the time the
probationer served in a county jail. See id., at 67-68. However, his statement reveals
that the criticism is broader. See id. He'pointed out that the jail time was a condition of
probation, which implied the broader criticism, that "it is nonsensical and improper to
allow credit for parolees who adhere to the terms of their parole, but not credit
probationers who adhere to the terms of their probation (which may include serving jail
time)."

See id.

Therefore, the broad interpretation of "at large" is unreasonable

it would make I. C. § 18-309 incoherent within the context of the criminal justice

as a whole, and therefore, such an interpretation must be rejected.

id.

During the time Mr. Stevenson was on probation and adhering to the terms and
conditions thereof, he was not free or unrestrained. He was subject to at least nineteen
different "special conditions" while he was on probation. (R., pp.76-78.) One of those
terms was that he serve 210 days in the Ada County Jail, of which he had fifty still to
serve, and his probation officer had discretion to require Mr. Stevenson to serve as
many as sixty additional days in local incarceration. (R., pp.76-77.) Therefore, he was
actually physically confined in a penal facility during part of his probation. 6

He was

controlled, in that he had to maintain full-time employment. (R., p.??) He was required
to attend any treatment program recommended by his probation officer. (R., p.??) He
was also required to complete a domestic violence evaluation and follow any treatment

6 The district court did award Mr. Stevenson credit against this term, leaving him with
fifty days that he would be required to serve. (R., p.?6.) He was also ultimately granted
an early release. (R., p.89.) Nevertheless, the fact that Mr. Stevenson was still
required to be incarcerated as part of his probation invokes Judge Schwartzman's
specific criticism. See Jakoski, 132 Idaho at 6? -69.
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recommendations resulting from that evaluation. (R., p.?8.)

His right to privacy was

restrained, as he was required to waive his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights
regarding searches of his person and property. (R., p.??) He was also required to
waive his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, as he was required to
truthfully answer all questions of his probation officer related to the terms of his
probation.

(R., p.??) He was even required to waive his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation at any subsequent hearing in regard to his probation. (R., p.??)

He was

not free in his use of his money, as he was prohibited from purchasing certain items,
such as firearms or alcohol, and as he was required to pay all court-imposed costs,
including restitution and the costs for supervision. (R., pp.?6-7?) He was restricted in
regard

his whereabouts, as he was required to waive extradition and not contest

efforts to return him to Idaho, regardless of whether his absence from the state
was approved by his probation officer.

(R., p.78.)

Thus, given these restraints on

Mr. Stevenson, it cannot be said that he was free, unrestrained, or not under control,
and therefore, it cannot be said that he was "at large" during his period of probation.
Furthermore, Mr. Stevenson worked to comply with those restraints and controls
on his freedom pursuant to his probation for three years. (See generally R. (no reports
of violation filed between the order granting Mr. Stevenson early release on April 24,
2009, and the probable cause form filed on March 3, 2012, based on an agent's
warrant).) During that time, Mr. Stevenson accepted the restrictions to his rights and
restraints to his freedom that are associated with all forms of punishment imposed by
the criminal justice system. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, he was not free,
unrestrained, or not under control due to the terms of his probation. This is true, even
though the report of violation indicates he was not fully successful at all times during
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that three-year period. (See

,pp.1 06-08.) None of those violations are based on his

absconding from supervision. 7 (See generally R., pp.106-08.) He also remained in the
custody of the Department of Correction throughout that time. See

19-2604(1), 20-

219(1). Therefore, during that time, Mr. Stevenson was not "at large," as the term is
ordinarily defined. As such, the order denying his request for credit for that time was
erroneous, since the statute authorizes credit against that term of sentence except for
the time that the defendant was at large. See I.C. § 18-309.
Thus, by examining the specific term of art the Legislature chose to use, its intent
becomes clear: the only scenario in which it intended a probationer to be denied credit
under this
their common

was if he absconds from supervision. Therefore, giving the terms
statute is

time during

which he was [absconding] must not be computed as part

such

" I.e. § 18-309.

And, pursuant to the reasonable interpretation of the statute, denying Mr. Stevenson
credit for the time during which he was not at large, but rather in the custody of the
Department of Correction and adhering to the numerous restraints and controls on his
freedom (which the Supreme Court recognized functioned to restrict the defendant's
actions just like incarceration), was improper. See id.

Mr. Stevenson does recognize that one of the allegations that he admitted was Failure
to Appear. (R, p.1 07.) However, that allegation does not indicate that he had
absconded supervision or that his probation officer did not know where he was; rather, it
only indicates that he missed a court appearance. (See R, pp.107, 110.) And even if
that is sufficient to determine he was at large, the record demonstrates that he would
have been at large for a total of twenty-one days, as he turned himself into authorities
on September 20, 2011. (R, p.11 0.) Thus, even in that case, I.e. § 18-309 would only
disallow credit for those twenty-one days.
7
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D.

The Statute Is, At Least, Ambiguous, And The Rule Of Lenity Requires That
Ambiguity Be Resolved In Mr. Stevenson's Favor
To the extent that there are multiple, rational interpretations of the terms in the

statute, specifically in regard to the terms "at large" and "temporarily released," this
statute is, at least, ambiguous as to whether credit should be given for time spent in the
custody of the Department of Correction adhering to all the restrictive terms of
probation. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. In such an instance, the rule of lenity
requires the ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Stevenson's favor.
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007).

See, e.g.,

In this case, that would mean that

Mr. Stevenson should be credited for the time he spent on probation adhering to the
restrictions thereof.

II.

The Idaho Supreme Court Deprived Mr. Stevenson Of His Constitutional Rights To Due
Process And Equal Protection By Denying His Request To Augment The Record With
Transcripts Of Hearings Relevant To The Issue Of Whether The District Court Should
Have Reduced His Sentence Pursuant To I.C.R. 35(b)
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered when indigent defendants are
entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724. Its
opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that, when reviewing
decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing,
focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 728 (citing State v. Pierce,
150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010».

The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that there is a

federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts sufficient
for an adequate appellate review.

See id. at 727-28 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago,

404 U.S. 189,195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002».
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That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United

Constitution and

Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 1
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. SeN. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho

at 445. Those same standards have been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho
221,227 (1998).
The United States Supreme Court

addressed the question of whether

must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established.
Griffin

v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12

(1

, Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S.

v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487,494-95 (1963); Mayer,
have established two fundamental themes.

U

(1959);

189. Its

First, the scope of the due process and

equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants
is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate

8

In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious
discriminations.

Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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review, but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g.,
Mayer, 404 U

. at 195.

As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the
transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for
its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional
transcripts."g Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727; but see Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195 ("where the
grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript,
the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative'
will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds").
The grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the
sentencing hearing held on April 10, 2009, the disposition hearing held on May 18,
2012, and the rider review hearing held on September 12, 2012.

The minutes of

"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ...
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to
support the actions of the trial court."g State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999);
see also State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 805 (1996) (applying this presumption in absence
of a complete record). Therefore, if Mr. Stevenson fails to provide the appellate court
with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Stevenson's claims regarding the relinquishment of jurisdiction will not be
addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme
Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective
appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection
grounds. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is
"constitutionally invalid . . . to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal")
(emphasis added).
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485.
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to
relinquish jurisdiction because the district court obviously concluded at the sentencing
hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to justify incarcerating
Mr. Stevenson, given the objectives of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin,
131 Idaho 642,648 (1998).
9
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sentencing hearing only indicate Mr. Stevenson "r/r PSI, no additional time ... makes a
statement to the Court; discussion with Court regarding living arrang[ements]."
(R., pp.68-69.)

When a defendant makes a statement of allocution at a sentencing

hearing, those comments are relevant to the sentencing determination.

See, e.g.,

State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by
State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied, (finding that, while
allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right, as
the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested). Therefore, those statements
are relevant to the subsequent question of whether to reduce the sentence pursuant to

See Merwin, 131 Idaho
1990). However,

minutes

648; State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App.
the contents of Mr. Stevenson's statements

not

to the court. (See generally R., pp.68-69.) Therefore, the minutes of these hearings do
not provide an adequate alternative to the verbatim transcript. Therefore, the grounds
of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the April 10, 2009, sentencing
hearing in this case.
Disposition hearings, such as the one held on May 18, 2012, and rider review
hearings, such as the one held on September 12, 2012, deal with similar concerns to
sentencing hearings, since the district court is deciding whether or not to continue the
defendant on probation, or whether to execute the underlying sentence and remand the
defendant to custody. See, e.g., State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 263-64 (Ct. App.
2003) (discussing

these

concerns

as they relate to

rider review hearings);

State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing these concerns as
they relate to disposition hearings). Those decisions are guided by the same factors
that the district court considers at sentencing.
21

See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.

Therefore, the defendant's statements at a disposition hearing are as relevant to
subsequent sentencing determination as a statement in allocution made at an initial
sentencing hearing. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. The
minutes of both hearings indicate that Mr. Stevenson "makes a statement to the Court."
(R., pp.142, 149.) As such, those statements are relevant to the subsequent question

of whether to reduce the sentence pursuant to Rule 35. And, as with the sentencing
hearing minutes, neither minute entry reveals the contents of those statements. (See
generally R., pp.142, 149.) Therefore, neither minute entry is a sufficient alternative to

the verbatim transcripts. Thus, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the
transcripts of the May 18, 201

disposition hearing and the September 12, 2012, rider

review hearing in this case.
The only other question, then, is whether those statements were part of the entire
record available to the district court when it subsequently revoked Mr. Stevenson's
probation. See Brunet, 155 Idaho at 728; Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5. The district court is
entitled to rely the knowledge gained from its own official position and observations, and
thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior proceedings in a case.
See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367,373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak,

105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing
are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98
Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon "the number of
certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within
his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Adams, 115
Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the district court "naturally and
quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in
22

reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491,495 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
"the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about [the
defendant] from the other case").

the same district court judge who denied

Mr. Stevenson's motion for leniency also presided over all three of the hearings at issue

(compare R., pp.68, 142, 149, 187), the comments made by Mr. Stevenson at those
hearings are part of the record that was available to the district court when it denied his
motion for leniency.
Therefore, because the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for those
transcripts and they were part of the record before the district court when it denied
Mr. Stevenson's motion for leniency, due process
be augmented to

appel/ate

10

equal protection require that they

Mayer, 404 U.S.

195; Brunet, 155 Idaho at

10 In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate
Mr. Stevenson's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)).
Appellate counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file
a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The standards for effective appellate representation are set
forth in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense
Function. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991). Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides:

Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can neither
make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal, nor
consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to revoke
probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Stevenson on
the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. Therefore, Mr. Stevenson has
23

727. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Stevenson's request to
augment the record with that transcript violates his constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Stevenson's Motion For
Reduction In Sentence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.
State v. Huffman, 1

Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

When petitioning for a sentence

reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is

in

light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. 'The criteria
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were
altered by the new evidence Mr. Stevenson presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at
203.

A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence.

See e.g.,

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90

(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco,
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301
(1990).

not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
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The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation;
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the
primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497,500
(1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the other
objectives will be considered reasonable.

/d.; State v. To oh ill, 103 Idaho 565, 568

(Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the
other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau,
124 Idaho

500; I.C. § 19-2521.

In this case,

Mr. Stevenson presented new and additional information,

specifically, a record documenting his

in various prison programs, inciuding

Alcoholics Anonymous, Boundaries, and

Family 12 Step

(R., p.183.)

Thus, this new information demonstrates that Mr. Stevenson has been working on
issues directly related to issues that underlay the offense for which he was convicted.
(See PSI, pp.68-69, 81.)

These efforts, then, demonstrate that Mr. Stevenson has

taken steps toward rehabilitation, thereby reducing the risk he poses to society.
Considering that new information along with the mitigating factors in the record
demonstrates that a more lenient sentence is appropriate, since sentences are to be
crafted so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person once
rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism.

Cook, 145 Idaho at 489;

State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,639 (Ct. App. 1988).

For example, according to Mr. Stevenson, he brandished the knife because he
felt that the three identified victims were coming at him in an aggressive manner and
took his backpack, making him feel as though he had to defend himself.
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(PSI,

pp.68-69.}

The police report of the victims' account is not inconsistent with

Mr. Stevenson's version of events, as they admitted they were trying to take
Mr. Stevenson's bag. (PSI, p.81.) The Legislature has indicated that where "[t]here
were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct,
though failing to establish a defense," is a factor which "shall be accorded weight in
favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment." I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(c). Therefore, since
such circumstances existed in Mr. Stevenson's case, that factor demonstrates a more
lenient sentence is appropriate.
The presence of those circumstances becomes more impactful in that regard
when they are considered in light of Mr. Stevenson's mental health issues, specifically
major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified). (PSI, p.27.)
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness
as a sentencing factor.

Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

Given that

Mr. Stevenson suffers from an anxiety disorder, his reaction to being confronted by
three people trying to take his backpack, though not justified, becomes more
understandable. As such, this further demonstrates why a more lenient sentence is
appropriate in Mr. Stevenson's case.
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient
sentence,11 would still address all the sentencing objectives - protection of society,
punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713
(1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives).
By imposing a more lenient sentence the district court would still impose and execute a

11 For example, Mr. Stevenson recommended removing half of the indeterminate portion
of his sentence. (R., p.165.) That would result in a unified sentence of five years, with
two years fixed, rather than a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed.
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sentence against Mr. Stevenson. Thus, even a reduced sentence could still provide for
a significant period of custodial supervision, if not incarceration. Such a sentence would
punish Mr. Stevenson by depriving him not only of his liberty for that period of time, but
several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony
offense. Therefore, both retribution and deterrence would be served by a more lenient
sentence. See, e.g., State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing
how even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives).
In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of society,
deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would receive
equally similar protection in both cases, as Mr. Stevenson would be in the custody of
Department of

either way. He would be unable to harm society during

the period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the discretion to
release him again, or, if need be, continue to keep him in prison.
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence
would not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted,
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394,
402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228
(1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,91 (1982). Specifically, it would give Mr. Stevenson

the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation in the community setting, where he could
provide a benefit to the society. After all, Mr. Stevenson does possess employable
skills, having earned his vocational technology degree for heavy equipment operation.
(PSI, p.25.)

Delaying such opportunities would actually decrease the protection for

society in the long term because prison does not decrease the risk for recidivism as
effectively as a sentence focused on rehabilitation. Therefore, the best way to protect
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society would be to provide Mr. Stevenson with rehabilitative opportunities. To not do
so will result in lesser protection for society in the long term, which means the sentence
fails to sufficiently address the primary sentencing objective, and thus requires
mod ification.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Stevenson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his
motion for credit for time served and that it remand this case for a proper calculation of
credit.

He also respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the

opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review.

In

this request is denied, Mr. Stevenson's

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision to deny his motion for leniency
and reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand the case for a
reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35.
DATED this 1ih day of March, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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